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## WASHINGTON, D. C.

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For the National Era.

HERMAN;

or,

## YOUNG KNIGHTHOOD.

BY E. FOXTON,

Author of "Premises."

CHAPTER XXI.

The Knight's Champion.

"Pour toute vertu, on ne lui enseigne que l'honneur,"  
Invention.  
"There are men in the slave States, slave-holders, who feel the infinite degradation of this position. Not only conscientious men, who abhor the injustice, but spiritued men, who cannot brook the shame, are chafing impatiently under the yoke they wear, felt by them to be heavier and more dishonorable than that which they impose. They see their case themselves; and how ludicrous it belies that large prating, in the \* vocabulary of honor, in which they have been wont to indulge!"—Papers on the Slave Power.

Rested, shaved, and most correctly dressed the next morning, Edward was himself again. At the earliest hour admissible he waited upon Judge Sharkey, and offered his bail. The judge hesitated, thought it would be necessary to put the bail "pretty high—as high as"—he eyed Edward keenly from head to foot—"well-forty or fifty thousand dollars."

"If you will have the goodness to bid your clerk make out the bond, I will sign it."

"Well, that is, supposing I concluded to allow of bail. I am not as yet prepared to decide, without further consideration and consultation. I would, at any rate, require some prominent citizen of this State to be bound together with you?"

"I will call on your neighbor, Mr. Trimmer, then. He was an acquaintance and friend of my father, formerly, I understand, at Washington. Will that do?"

"Well, yes, sir—perfectly well." The judge's brown leather lips pressed themselves firmly up in the middle, and drew themselves down at the corners; but Edward could guess why—his eyes lit up through his spectacles like those of a wicked little terrier with his nose at a rat-hole. "If Hiram Trimmer agrees to offer bail, I think I can, without further demur, engage to accept of it."

And Edward accordingly, in his most urbane and courtly manner, straightway presented himself, and a letter of introduction which he had brought with him, to the Honorable Hiram Trimmer, a magistrate in high office. He found him bearing his honors weekly, a bland fatherly man, with obtrusive false teeth, who received him very civilly. After a little easy and agreeable conversation on general topics, sufficient, as he rightly judged, to make a most favorable impression, Edward opened his business, offering the best securities in Boston.

"Hum, ha—very sorry. Would be very happy. Any service within my power. Was in Congress with your late lamented parent. Most patriotic and enlightened merchant! We gentlemen of the South always knew where to go when we wanted a voice for the rights of our whole glorious Union, however bounded! Did much, indeed, to establish our mutual interests."

"Most statesmanlike mind. Saw through the intricate science of political economy, to use a bold hyperbole, like a lynx through a stone wall! He ever protected the property of our section of the country, we did the like, as often as we saw occasion, for the benefit of all."

"Yes, again, secondly, the revenue of the property of his section enabled the holders thereof at election time to disburse such sums as were requisite to elect men like him, unawares to protect our interests. *Epergne unum, Unum stant—dividi debet*. Most to be regretted that boys should lose their fathers! Get into bad company and misguided. Regretful for it when it's too late! Unfortunate and embarrassing occurrence. Public mind's a good deal excited. Ironical in Sharkey. [For this reason, perhaps, Mr. Trimmer had for some years held a high office within the State, to the misfortune and loss of many of his constituents.] That paid him his salary, and let them alone. Judge Sharkey's, a more 'sainted' man, had, however, just been put up against him, by a large minority, as a rival candidate at the next election. Brother'd be safest just now in jail, I opine, wouldn't he?"

"How so, sir?"

"Well, the mind of the public's exasperated, much to be deplored! A good deal exasperated. Two alarming attacks on the jail already. Didn't he inform you?"

"No, sir."

"Yes sir. Extra guard ordered out; and, night before last, I was fearful they had had him in confinement all day."

"I understand," cried Edward, straining to keep on his courtesy, and keep his seat, "that in this part of the country prisoners are at the mercy of the mob?"

"Far from it, sir! The furthest possible from it, I assure you. Never when it can be obviated. That was the object of ordering out the guard, sir."

"Could not he leave the State on bail?"

"Well, I'm fearful that could not be suffered in the present attitude of the public mind."

"Is there no safe place of confinement to which he could be sent?"

"There'd still remain the peril of effecting his transfer. I would be likely to be very apprehensive of a rescue. Would hardly like to dare venturing to assume the responsibility."

"Brother calm, when you left him?"

"I believe so; I have hardly seen him otherwise; except once, indeed, when a poor man was flogged for going in the evening, by his master's orders, to call a physician for his mistress. It was very impolitic; but, somehow, Edward could not help saying it."

"Oh, ah! Unfortunately caught without a pair, I presume?"

"But, if he was sent off in a hurry, and could not get one?"

"Very culpable negligence on the part of his owners, in that case, I should infer. But the master, having their standards, can't deviate."

"Possible? Why, human masters do not like their servants to be punished, and therefore seldom reward them; nor, if they are cruel, do they. The Regulation operates beneficially, upon the whole. Ruin servants to sanction their running around at night."

"But would human slaves like to have their owners whipped?"

"Ha, ha! Well, I wouldn't hardly like to venture to express an opinion. Can't expect much sensibility on the part of the rascals!"

Edward was about to receive a reward for his resolute imitation of complacency, such as it had been. "You have no conception, sir, if I may be permitted to mention it, how you reveal to my remembrance your dear mother. Your humor and—there—your smile! Ah! what a fine lady she was!"

"But would human slaves like to see such ladies at this day, sir?"

"At home, sir, I think I do—one, to whom I

## THE NATIONAL ERA.

G. BAILEY, EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR; JOHN G. WHITTIER, CORRESPONDING EDITOR.

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## WASHINGTON, D. C.

THURSDAY, APRIL 21, 1859.

### THE PRESIDENTIAL QUESTION.

Some months ago, we had occasion to protest against a concerted movement in certain quarters, to divert the Republican movement of its characteristic features, and supersede the Republican party by a general Opposition, to be rallied on old Whig principles, and under the lead of some distinguished survivor of the old Whig party. The protest was timely, and the general emphatic response to it from the Republicans and their newspapers was—"No change of Party, no change of Issues—let us adhere to our distinctive principles, and to our REPRESENTATIVE MEN."

Since then, a few politicians, honest and patriotic, we doubt not, in their motives, but afraid to commit their cause on its merits to the People's verdict, have been laboring to procure a modification of this decision. They were doubtful whether the election in 1860 could be carried by Seward, Chase, McLean, Hale, Banks, or Fessenden, but might not the Opposition be continued under the lead of Crittenton, Bell, Botts, or Bates? Was it not necessary, in fact, to conciliate the Conservatives of the country?

Or let us put the question in plain terms—it was not necessary to disband the Republican party, and reorganize the Whig party, under such auspices and with such tactics as had favored the Compromise of 1850, to disgraceful acquiescence in every usurpation of the Slave Power, and, at last, in 1854, split that organization, and shivered it to atoms? A notable project for achieving success!

Bell, Crittenton and Botts, soon ceased to be spoken of, but the New York *Tribune* took pains to keep Mr. Bates before its readers, as if he occupied a position more in harmony with Republican ideas. The "Whig General Committee" of New York, which now and then gets up out of a deep sleep, and makes its appearance upon the public stage with as much solemnity as if the Whig party had not become defunct several years ago, went through the farce last February of passing resolutions and addressing a circular to some prominent men of the old school, asking their opinion on the present crisis and its duties. Edward Bates, of Missouri, one of the elect honored by his confidence, replied, it was generally understood, in an elaborate letter, which, however, was not published. The *Tribune* inquired for it repeatedly—wished to know why it was not forthcoming—and its frequent allusions to it were calculated to convey the impression that the letter was entirely too liberal and expansive to suit the ideas of the antiquated Whig Committee. We watched with some curiosity this new method of manufacturing an Anti-Slavery reputation for a Fillmore, Slaveholding Whig, confident, however, that should the wonderful letter ever be printed, it would prove nothing more than a resume of the respectable commonplaces of Conservatism, which constitute the sum and substance of all wise statesmanship with the Fillmores and Hunts of the North, the Stewarts and Grahams of the South.

The result is what we expected. The Letter of Mr. Bates never reached its destination: so, he made another copy of it, sent it to New York, and it is published. The *Tribune* contains it at full length, but our readers must excuse us if we reserve the columns of the *Era* for something else. A confession of faith from Millard Fillmore would be quite as original and edifying.

Mr. Bates, writing to the Committee, says:

"Sir:—A short time ago, I was favored with your note of the 7th inst., covering a resolution of the committee, to the effect that it is inconvenient at this time further to discuss or agitate the negro question, but rather to turn the attention of the people to other topics—topics of general importance, such as our foreign relations, including the extension of territory; the building of railroads for national purposes; the improvement of our harbors; the navigation of our rivers, to facilitate internal commerce; the subject of currency, and a tariff of duties, and other means of developing our own internal resources, our home wealth, and binding together by ties of national and fraternal feelings the various parts and sections of our widely-extended Republic."

Mr. Bates proceeds to answer, stating that he has opinions, fixed ones, too, on all these points. The Negro Question he disposes of summarily, and rather indignantly, and then devotes nearly two columns to a reiteration of old Whig doctrines, about Retrenchment, Economy, the One-Man Power, Territorial Expansion, Internal Improvements, and a Tariff. As to the Usurpations of Slavery, its Schemes of Propagandism, its Kansas Policy, the Pro-Slavery dicta of the Supreme Court, the Lecompton outrages, &c., not a word. Opposed to the violent acquisition of Cuba and to filibustering it certainly is, as every gentleman ought to be, but he considers those Questions entirely apart from Slavery. He writes to the *Washington* correspondents of the Northern Republican newspapers; but, to our surprise, so far as we can ascertain, not one of them was present. This fact is the more surprising, since the probability of a mob was suggested and debated in circles where the speakers of news were likely to hear it. One would suppose that of all the places in the city, they say the South has a right to demand Congressional enactments for the security of slave property in the Territories, and that it is illogical to abstain from the enforcement of the right. So the man in the fable had a right to shear the wolf, but the exercise of the right involved a wolf of a question and a question of policy. So the South has a moral and constitutional right to insist on the revival of the African slave trade; but the exercise of that right involves issues of policy and physical power, which the wisest statesmen choose not to precipitate upon the country."

It is well known that Mr. Douglas, like the *Washington* newspaper, subscribes to the Federal doctrine that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitutional questions, and that in specific language he has admitted that the Dred Scott decision covers the whole ground. He therefore cannot resist the conclusions arrived at in the above article of the *States*, if he would; and he will not dare to make the attempt, unless he is ready to sever the last link that binds him to the slave oligarchy.

It is true, Mr. Douglas says, in his Freeport and other recent speeches, that the Territories may exclude Slavery by "unfriendly legislation." He explains this phrase to mean that they may refuse to legislate; but we believe that he has nowhere asserted that by positive legislation the Territorial Legislatures may prohibit Slavery. He insists that Slavery cannot exist without specific Territorial enactments for its protection. This position utterly inconsistent with his oft-repeated admission that slaves are property, standing on the same footing as other property. We have never heard that any specific recognition of other species of property was necessary to its protection. It is not necessary to declare by statute that horses and cattle shall be deemed as property. The condition of these animals is assumed to be of personal property; and if the terms horse and cow could not be found on the statutes of the Territories, no man would, in consequence, feel the slightest insecurity as regards that species of property. If a man's horse stray off, the owner pursues him, and takes him, as a matter of common-law right, without waiting for a legal warrant for his apprehension; and if the negro property in the same sense that the horse territories, there cannot be any more necessity for the legal recognition of the fact in the one case than in the other. In each case there may arise disputes about title between individual citizens; but if under the Constitution they

were Mexico for the sake of Slavery—enacted in 1850 the Fugitive Slave act, and set aside the Anti-Slavery Principle and Policy of the Government, in the regulation of our Territories, as established in the Ordinance of 1857—constrained both the Whig and Democratic Parties to swear by these acts as a final settlement of the controversy—in 1854 repealed the Missouri Compromise, and initiated a complicated series of Fraud, Tyranny, Violence, with a view to the establishment of Slavery in Free Territory—procured a *dictum* from the Supreme Court, intended to assert the right of Slavery to exist in all our Territories, in virtue of the Federal Constitution—committed Mr. Buchanan and his Party to that audacious and pestiferous heresy, as the test of Party orthodoxy; and, having accomplished all this, remains in possession of the Federal Executive and Judiciary, whose powers and influence it is laboring to use for the strengthening of its rule and the multiplication of its conquests. Conservatism, so called, North and South, is full of regret—very sorry that such things should have been done—but its language is, the mischief cannot be remedied; the least said, the soonest meddled; let agitation cease; let by-gones be by-gones; let us have peace.

Republicanism says—that is a servile policy. We will not endorse by our silence and acquiescence the great wrongs that have been perpetrated; we will not, by crying peace, peace, give impunity to the Tyrant evil, invest its usurpations with the color of right, strengthen it in its ill-gotten power, embolden it to further aggression. We will not rest till its domination is subverted, and the Federal Government placed under the control of the millions who believe that it should be used for the establishment of Justice and spread of Liberty, not for the base purposes of Slavery Propagandism.

Where does Edward Bates belong? To the Party of Compromise and Slavery, or to the Party of Freedom? He has answered the question frankly—"The Negro Question is a pestilent question," and he persists in urging it in its ill-gotten power, embolden it to further aggression. We will not rest till its domination is subverted, and the Federal Government placed under the control of the millions who believe that it should be used for the establishment of Justice and spread of Liberty, not for the base purposes of Slavery Propagandism.

The "Negro Question" is simply the *controvertible between Liberty and Slavery*—between the Slave Propaganda, bent on perpetuating their misrule and carrying out their mad projects and the Republicans, determined to rescue the Federal Government from their grasp. Millard Fillmore and J. J. Crittenton abhor and abjure this controversy, choosing rather to suffer for the Slave Power to remain in the possession of all its usurpations, and at liberty to prosecute its nefarious schemes, and are therefore, in the opinion of Edward Bates, elevated "National Statesmen." William H. Seward, P. Chase, F. P. Blair, boldly accept the controversy, determined to put down Propagandism, and it is to be noted that they do it with bitter score of the editor of the *States*. They are willing to concede the right to a cheap and abundant supply of the slaves.

We subjoin a copious extract from the article of the *States*, which, as we have said, is the recognised central metropolitan organ of the Douglas school of the Democracy. We do so, that our readers may see that we have not misrepresented this authoritative exposition of Mr. Douglas's hobby. From the Washington *States* of April 12:

"We confess ourselves at a loss to understand the obstinacy with which certain of the Southern contemporaries persist in treating an *entente*, as equivalent to squatting sovereignty.

"On their own theory, the denial of the power in Congress to prohibit Slavery in the Territories involves a denial of the power to a derivative and subordinate authority. Their argument appears to imply that the power, however, must exist somewhere; and being with held from Congress, it results necessarily to the Territorial Legislature. *For our own part, we contend that it is incompetent for the Federal Government, in any way, to operate, either by the immediate exertion of its authority, or through the agency of a substitute, to prohibit the exclusion of Slavery from the common domain.*

"This is our proposition: By the compact of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska act, and other declarations of its will, Congress renounced the exercise of any direct jurisdiction over the Territories, and delegated its power to the local Legislatures. The legitimacy of such substitution is incontestable, since Congress has always employed the expedient of Territorial Governments, through which to exert its authority, and that should delegate a portion, it may delegate the whole of its power to these subordinate institutions. *But Congress can hold no authority on the local Legislatures of which it was not itself possessed; and hence we maintain that a transfer of all its authority does not involve the right to prohibit the introduction and establishment of Slavery in the Territories.* This conclusion is in exact accordance with the principle propounded by the Supreme Court in the *Dred Scott case*.

"In reply, we will be told that others understand the matter differently—that General Cass, for example, in his speech to the Territorial Legislature, may enact an absolute exercise of Slavery. It is true, moreover, that a vast majority of all parties in the North either maintain this proposition, or else claim the right to prohibit the local Legislatures of which it was not itself possessed; and hence we maintain that a transfer of all its authority does not involve the right to prohibit the introduction and establishment of Slavery in the Territories.

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"This is our proposition: By the compact of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska act, and other declarations of its will, Congress renounced the exercise of any direct jurisdiction over the Territories, and delegated its power to the local Legislatures. The legitimacy of such substitution is incontestable, since Congress has always employed the expedient of Territorial Governments, through which to exert its authority, and that should delegate a portion, it may delegate the whole of its power to these subordinate institutions. *But Congress can hold no authority on the local Legislatures of which it was not itself possessed; and hence we maintain that a transfer of all its authority does not involve the right to prohibit the introduction and establishment of Slavery in the Territories.* This conclusion is in exact accordance with the principle propounded by the Supreme Court in the *Dred Scott case*.

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ly Mr. Sickles's coachman. Mrs. Sickles was in the habit of driving out during the hours when Congress was in session, and generally met Key. He usually got into the carriage, but never rode home with her except once, when Mr. Sickles was in New York. During the absence of Sickles, Key was in the habit of visiting Mrs. Sickles nearly every night, and remained late until one o'clock. They also were in the habit of visiting the cemetery at Georgetown, and alighting at the gate, walking down the hill out of his sight.

John Cooney, the coachman of Mr. Sickles, at the time of Key's death, gave similar testimony.

Mr. Wooldridge was recalled and cross-examined by the prosecution.

## THE PRINTING PLUNDER.

Public documents are apt to be long, formal, and prolix, and for that reason, however much valuable information they may contain, they often fail to be seen by the people. On this account, we prefer a synopsis of the Report of the House Investigating Committee on Printing, to the document itself. That report is from the Chairman, Mr. Taylor, of New York, a staunch supporter of the Administration; and the synopsis is by the editor of the *Washington States*, and is larded with racy comments, which we decline to endorse, though they will detract nothing from the interest of the subject. Let the reader bear in mind that the public printing and its superintendence are in the hands of the Democracy, that the exposure of the corruption is by a Democratic committee, and that the synopsis is by a Democratic editor, whom the Democracy of Virginia have recently complimented with a splendid service of plate. The article below, with all its damning statements, and its overwhelming evidence of corruption on the part of the owner of the *Organ*, is from the *States*. It is therefore no Republican fabrication, but a veritable admission, on unquestionable Democratic authority, of foul corruption at the very door, if not in the council chamber, of the Executive.

The frauds here made manifest were notorious long before Seaman was dropped from his place; and Wendell was, up to a few days past, the proprietor of the official organ. We copy from the *Washington States* of March 7:

"The fact, that for the last five years the American people have been subjected to an annual exaction of nearly a million dollars, on account of the public printing, is a circumstance which will not escape comment, even in this age of corrupt and extravagant expenditure."

"It is a striking instance of the perversion of Federal authority, that, in addition to its many other scandals, the Central Government has engaged so largely in the incompatible business of a public printer."

"It is a signal attestation of the decay of official virtue, that the appropriations for this unwarrantable purpose have been squandered in bribes and bounties to the very officials who were appointed to protect the public interests."

## Boston Correspondence.

*Weather—Elliott School Troubles—The Accidents to the Cochituate Aqueduct—Amusements, &c.*

Boston, April 13, 1859.

To the Editor of the *National Era*:

The opinion that March and April have changed places has been general prevalence here; for, snowily April, with its warm, spring-like cold and bluster, shows and bleaches of March.

And now we have had, for the past two weeks, cold hard winds, driving the dust and dirt, perfect clouds, making pedestrians thoroughly uncomfortable, and elongating the faces of shopkeepers to an alarming extent. Monday we had a storm of rain, hail, and snow, and today it has been some like spring.

There is now in circulation the prospectus of a new paper, called *The Spirit of Seventy-Six*, to be devoted to the maintenance of American principles, and the reading of the Bible in the public schools. This paper is evidently the effect of the Elliott school troubles; for those of the American feeling is very strong here; there were no indications of it till these papers were aroused by the attempt to drive the Bible from the public schools.

We are now having the full supply of Cochituate, the aqueduct being complete, and water flowing as usual. I am credibly informed that the consumption of water now in Boston has reached the amount which was calculated to be some time in the future, the main pipe running full, and all used, which was supposed would not be done for ten years to come.

The break was seen to be of interest, and was visited by thousands, and among them a delegation from the city of New York to examine the break and note the manner of repairing, and all the while the New York papers were making merry over the villagers who had not known how to construct an aqueduct.

"In the first place, the committee declare that the Superintendent kept his books 'so loose and negligent a manner as to make it almost impossible to ascertain the condition of the accounts between his office and the Government.'

"It cannot be discovered, for example, 'by some hundreds of dollars, how much paper was received, nor how much was delivered to the Public Printer, and that neither his accounts nor the account of paper to hand can be balanced.' The present Superintendent, an honest and efficient functionary, finds that the accounts of his predecessor, purporting to be closed, had not, in fact, been closed; and that large quantities of paper furnished to the binder by Seaman had not been paid for. The largest sum, \$1,167,707, was paid from Mr. Arnold, of Philadelphia. When Mr. Arnold was spoken to on the subject, he said the account had been settled by the way of a *loan* to Mr. Seaman."

"In the second place, the committee declare that the Superintendent had kept his books 'so loose and negligent a manner as to make it almost impossible to ascertain the condition of the accounts between his office and the Government.'

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[Continued from first page.]  
gives the pre-eminent endowment of thought, to another action, to another oratory. It is the glory of Jefferson to have been the philosopher of the Revolution—excelling even Franklin in this respect; for Franklin, with all his matchless powers, had consecrated them to the advancement of physical science, long before the events which led to the Revolution had transpired.

Mr. Jefferson grew up and his mind matured in the midst of these stirring times. His patriotic enthusiasm was strong, and he was among the first to take sides with his country against the Crown and Parliament of England. I will not weary you with a recital of the various political fictions which he filled, much less shall I attempt to show the important part which he played on the public stage; it will be sufficient for my purpose to touch upon the salient points of his public life, in order to show the identity of modern Republicanism with the principles of Mr. Jefferson.

This will be my object on the present occasion; and I will at the same time, show that no party in the history of the world has any affinity with Jefferson, nor any cognate body, the task is easy. Any man of common intelligence, who will read twenty or thirty pages of Jefferson's writings, and contrast them with the political history of the last two or ten years, can do the same thing.

I will not confine my examination of the political principles of Jefferson to the subject of Slavery; I intend to show his views of State Rights, and of the relative power of the State and Federal Governments, are in harmony with those of the Republican party; while the party now in power is thoroughly committed, in word and deed, to the most ultra Federalism.

I begin, however, with the Slavery question, because that is the greatest issue before the country; the great issue which has been the nucleus and centre of the Republican party, and which has at the same time been the rock which has shattered all other parties to atoms.

Let me first briefly state the principles and objects of this new party.

The Republican party has proposed no invasion of the rights of the States—not intermeddling by Congress with Slavery in the States; but it insists upon the right of Congress to exclude Slavery from the Territories, and consequently to free white labor and to restrain the importation of slaves, not of a handful of wealthy slaveholders, surrounded by thousands of black slaves, but States composed of freemen, white men, who will give invincible strength to the nation.

The Republican party also insists upon the right of freedom of speech and of the press. It insists upon, and when it attains the control of the Federal Government it will encourage, that sort of freedom of speech in all the South which for two or three years has existed in St. Louis, and whose fruits have been more than one triumph and election.

The Republican party is not in favor of the amalgamation of the white and black races, nor of a population composed of two separate races. Nineteen-tenths of its members, while they condemn the injustice which enslaves the black man, are anxious for his colonization, in Africa, in Mexico, in Central America, in South America, or in the West Indies. That party will favor the colonization of the free people of color and emancipated slaves, with their own consent, in any of these countries, and a proposal to this effect has been made in each branch of Congress by distinguished Republicans.

I intend to show that every one of these principles and proposed measures, the Republican party of the present day is only treading in the footsteps of Thomas Jefferson—only proposing to carry out his principles and measures—only endeavoring to realize the dream of his life.

It would be equally as easy to show that in this leading feature of the Republican platform there is the sanction of nearly every great and good name which achieved renown during the Revolution, whether in the field or in the council. It would be easy to quote Washington, Lee, Hamilton, the Adamses, the Randolphs, Mason, Henry, Pinckney, etc., etc., on the Republican principles above-mentioned; but I shall have enough to do at present to use the materials furnished by the writings of Jefferson himself.

Democracy with Mr. Jefferson was a synonym for universal freedom. The first sentence of the Declaration of Independence is demonstrative of this truth. It declares that "all men are created equal," and "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This declaration was, and is still, discredited by despots who say that this declaration of rights was not intended to embrace black men; but there exists the most abundant testimony to the contrary. Mr. Jefferson was fully committed to the universality of Freedom before he became a member of the Continental Congress. In his celebrated paper on the "Rights of British America," prepared while he was a member of the General Assembly of Virginia, and published in 1774, he says:

"The abolition of domestic Slavery is the greatest object of desire in these Colonies, where it was unhappily introduced in their infant state."

In his original draft of the Declaration of Independence, he used the following language: "He (the King) 'has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty, in the persons of a distant people who have never offended him; who signs and carries into slavery in another hemisphere, so to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel Powers, is the warfare of the Christian King of Great Britain.' Determined to keep open a market where men could be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for opposing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce; and that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguishing die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people on whom he has so unmercifully bestowed them—thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another."—*Madison Papers*, p. 18.

The extract from Mr. Jefferson's original draft of the Declaration of Independence to be found in his works, as well as in the Madison Papers, Mr. Jefferson says of it, that "The clause, too, reprobating the enslaving of the Africans, was struck out in compliance to the demands of the English Government, to whom he had given the object of the Declaration of Independence in the cause of India, in exchange, eleven of the thirteen States, in which were embraced all the power of resistance to the common enemy, yielded to the two weak States, which required protection from internal foes."

But this rejected passage sufficiently explains the general terms of universal Freedom contained in the Declaration, and leaves not a doubt that they were designed to embrace all mankind. I may remark, in this connection, that Mr. Madison declared the object of the struggle with Great Britain to be, "the rights of human nature."

It is clear, then, that not only Mr. Jefferson, but the great majority of the patriots of the Revolution, were the friends of universal Freedom. There is other evidence in abundance to the same purport, but it is aside from my main design at the present time to take so wide a range of investigation.

Having shown what were the fundamental principles which actuated Mr. Jefferson, I will next draw your attention to the numerous measures he instituted for the abolition of Slavery in his native State, and for preventing its spread into the new Territories.

In a plan of a Constitution for Virginia, drawn by Mr. Jefferson in 1783, it is provided that the General Assembly shall not "permit the introduction of any more slaves to remain in this State, or the continuance of Slavery beyond the generation which shall be living on the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred—all persons born after that day henceforth declared free."

I might quote numerous letters of Mr. Jefferson, showing his profound interest in this question of ridding Virginia of the curse of Slavery; but I must refrain, for want of time.

In 1784, Virginia, New York, and Connecticut, ceded the territory northwest of the Ohio

to the Federal Government. Mr. Jefferson, then a member of Congress, was placed on a committee appointed to draft an ordinance for the government of the Territories. It fell to the share of Mr. Jefferson to write the ordinance, and he failed not to incorporate in it his deep-seated repugnance to Slavery. It provided for the organization of all the Territories of the Union, "ceded and to be ceded," into States, and forever excluded Slavery from them, to the north of the thirty-first parallel of latitude, which then separated the Territories of the United States from the Spanish province of Florida.

The Anti-Slavery provision of the Ordinance, which I will now read to you extracts from Mr. Jefferson's writings, and then I propose to contrast with them the more recent teachings of the so-called Democratic party.

In the 9th volume of Mr. Jefferson's Works, at page 464, I find a series of resolutions which the compiler of his Works thinks were the original of the famous Kentucky resolutions of 1798. The Virginia resolutions of 1798, of which you have heard so much, were from the womb of Mr. Madison; and they are substantially the same as those proposed by Mr. Jefferson for Kentucky. The first of these is as follows:

"After the year 1800 of the Christian era, there shall be neither Slave nor involuntary servitude in any of the said States, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted to have been personally guilty."

The Northern States represented on the occasion all voted for the ordinance; Virginia was divided, but the majority overruled Mr. Jefferson, and cast the vote of the State against the restrictive clause. Sixteen of the twenty-three delegates present voted for excluding Slave. The measure failed for want of a two-thirds vote, and the compact was not ratified by nine States, but was ratified by the remaining three, and voted by a majority of their delegates. This was near the close of a busy session, and the subject was not again taken up, or, at any rate, not disposed of, until 1787. At that time Mr. Jefferson was in France, as the representative of his country; but the principle of his Anti-Slavery proviso of 1784 was incorporated into the ordinance adopted in 1787.

The ninth article of this Ordinance is as follows:

"There shall be neither Slavery nor involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."—*Providence*. Any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service may be lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service, as aforesaid."

This Anti-Slavery ordinance for the government of the territories northwest of the Ohio was adopted by the vote of the entire South, Kentucky, having become an integral part of Virginia by the organization of counties, was ceded to the federal government; and the territories south of it, now embraced in the States of Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, were in like manner recognized as parts of North Carolina and Georgia.

The Anti-Slavery ordinance of 1787, therefore, embraced all the territories over which the Federal Government had control. Slavery was forever excluded from them, and their unparallel prosperity is entirely owing to this Jefferson ordinance.

I might illustrate the wisdom of this Jeffersonian policy of excluding Slavery from the Territories, by pointing you to the States of North Carolina, Tennessee, and Mississippi, and to Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. But it is unnecessary. Every schoolboy is familiar with the subject, and can tell you of the magic growth of the free States, and of the small pace of those that tolerate Slavery.

The Republican party is not in favor of the amalgamation of the white and black races, nor of a population composed of two separate races. Nineteen-tenths of its members, while they condemn the injustice which enslaves the black man, are anxious for his colonization, in Africa, in Mexico, in Central America, in South America, or in the West Indies. That party will favor the colonization of the free people of color and emancipated slaves, with their own consent, in any of these countries, and a proposal to this effect has been made in each branch of Congress by distinguished Republicans.

I intend to show that every one of these principles and proposed measures, the Republican party of the present day is only treading in the footsteps of Thomas Jefferson—only proposing to carry out his principles and measures—only endeavoring to realize the dream of his life.

A letter to W. H. Torrance, dated Monticello, June 11, 1815, Mr. Jefferson says:

"The second question, whether the judges are invested with exclusive authority to decide on the constitutionality of a law, has been heretofore a subject of consideration with me in the course of my studies; but there is not a word in the Constitution which gives that power to them, more than to the Executive or Legislative branches. Questions of property, of character, and of crime, being ascribed to the judges through a definite course of legal procedure, laws involving such questions being, of course, to them; and as they decide on them ultimately, and without appeal, they of course decide for themselves. The constitutionality of the law or laws again prescribing Executive action, and to be administered by that branch ultimately, and without appeal, the Executive will decide for themselves also, whether under the Constitution they are valid or not. So also is it the law, in deciding the proceedings of the Legislature, that body which I might read from scores of Mr. Jefferson's letters, written at every period of his life, from early prime to old age, in which his Anti-Slavery sentiments are expressed with that nervous energy and beauty of language for which his style was remarkable. I might quote his Notes on Virginia, written or first published while he resided in France. The denunciations of Slavery contained in that work have never been exceeded in severity, and I should be charged with bias if I were to say that they are not equal to those of the late Attorney General Cushing, who has written a more forcible and forcible defense of the Constitution."

Shade of Jefferson! What would that philosopher founder of the States Rights creed say to this? What! a Democratic organ, the organ of a Democratic Administration, declare it treason to question the validity of a Supreme Court decision!

I will not now stop to expose the assumption of the *Union*, that the people in the Presidential election, and the President and his party, who won it, in fact he fell short of a popular majority by nearly four hundred thousand. I let this pass for what it is worth.

I proceed to another subject, and that is the constitutionality of the law, or laws, prescribing Executive action, and to be administered by that branch ultimately, and without appeal, the Executive will decide for themselves also, whether under the Constitution they are valid or not. So also is it the law, in deciding the proceedings of the Legislature, that body which I might read from scores of Mr. Jefferson's letters, written at every period of his life, from early prime to old age, in which his Anti-Slavery sentiments are expressed with that nervous energy and beauty of language for which his style was remarkable. I might quote his Notes on Virginia, written or first published while he resided in France. The denunciations of Slavery contained in that work have never been exceeded in severity, and I should be charged with bias if I were to say that they are not equal to those of the late Attorney General Cushing, who has written a more forcible and forcible defense of the Constitution."

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